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On Computable Abstractions
(A Conceptual Introduction)
Alejandro Sánchez Guinea ∗
Abstract
This paper introduces abstractions that are meaningful for com-
puters and that can be built and used according to computers’ own
criteria, i.e., computable abstractions. It is analyzed how abstractions
can be seen to serve as the building blocks for the creation of one own’s
understanding of things, which is essential in performing intellectual
tasks. Thus, abstractional machines are defined, which following a me-
chanical process can, based on computable abstractions, build and use
their own understanding of things. Abstractional machines are illus-
trated through an example that outlines their application to the task
of natural language processing.
1 Introduction
An abstraction may be seen as a construct that encompasses one or many
things, holding ‘meaningful information’ about the things encompassed ac-
cording to certain ‘criteria’.
It is the meaningful information of an abstraction what makes possible
to ‘discard’ or ‘forget about’ the things encompassed. Suppose, for instance,
that we have a computer program named print_on_screen for printing
something on screen. The name of the program may tell us — as it is the case
here — what the program is about (i.e., it gives us meaningful information
about the program). Based on this we can use the program (e.g., to build
other programs) irrespectively if we know or not what are the operations
that the program needs to execute to print something on screen. That is,
the name of the program together with its meaning form a construct that
is abstracting the program including the operations that it uses to work as
expected.
∗University of Luxembourg.
Email: ale.sanchez.guinea@gmail.com or alejandro.sanchezguinea@uni.lu
1
Abstractions are essential when a person performs intellectual tasks.
Based on their meaningful information they can serve as the building blocks
for creating one’s own understanding of things, allowing to distinguish one
thing from others regardless of their level of abstraction, as well as to relate
different things under different contexts and at different levels of abstraction.
In this way, humans can figure out or learn what things are about (e.g., what
is to be done, how to do it, what can be used to do it) and act accordingly.
While computers are typically in close interaction with abstractions (in
any computer program), abstractions that have been defined and used in
the past cannot be considered to be computable, as their information has
remained meaningful only for humans and the criteria to build them have
remained dependent on human thinking. These issues have limited the pos-
sibilities of computers towards performing intellectual tasks by not having
the capability of creating their own understanding of things. One can ob-
serve that regardless of how ‘data-dependent’ or ‘data-driven’ computers
have been made, they have remained being governed by the original pro-
gram(s), perhaps with modified parameters, but never able to make sense
out of things.
This paper introduces computable abstractions which are meaningful for
computers and that can be built and used according to computers’ own crite-
ria. Based on this, it is proposed the construction of abstractional machines
capable of building and using their own understanding of things. § 2 presents
a preliminary analysis that will serve for the development of further sections,
in particular, § 2.1 analyzes current approaches, their issues, and outlines the
solution proposed in this paper. § 3 introduces computable abstractions and
describes a mechanical abstracting process to build and use computable ab-
stractions. In § 4 abstractional machines are defined and illustrated through
an example that outlines their application to the task of natural language
processing.
2 Preliminary Analysis
2.1 Abstractions & Computers
In this section we analyze the view about abstractions and the mechanisms
to obtain them and manipulate them, which has been widely accepted in
artificial intelligence approaches and in computer science, in general. We
explain the issues that such view entails and outline the solution that is
proposed in this paper.
2
2.1.1 Current View
Abstraction: The Object Abstractions that interact with computers
have typically been designed either as to ease human interpretation or based
on what humans understand, and not as to being meaningful for computers
(e.g., object-oriented programming [3], ontologies [6], logic [21, 18]).
Example 1. Consider an object-oriented class C, in some computer C, which
was designed by some person ρ as part of the writing of program P in C. We
assume that C was designed with the intention of representing some category
of things κ in the context of P, as understood by ρ (at least). Thus, the
specification of C is in general expected to help us (humans), specifically
those who understand it, to reason about κ in the context of P, to ease
the overall understanding for ρ, etc. Nonetheless, for C such specification
provides only information related to, for instance, how memory is to be
reserved for the creation of instances of C, and not about the category that
C is supposed to represent (i.e., κ).
The term ‘computable abstraction’ has appeared scarcely in the litera-
ture, e.g., [20] in artificial intelligence, and [19, 10, 15] in formal verification
and model checking. Nonetheless, different works have considered (implic-
itly) an abstraction to be computable inasmuch as it can be processed by a
computer, e.g., [12, 16, 7, 1].
The Abstraction Mechanism Approaches in artificial intelligence have
employed a so called abstraction mechanism [23]. The prevailing view of an
abstraction mechanism (e.g., in knowledge representation [13], reinforcement
learning [2], heuristic methods [4]), can be pictured as a program P that
takes some input I and obtain, according to a predefined ‘criteria’, some
‘representation’ which relates objects in I between each other or relate them
to other objects given by the program, where the resulting ‘representation’ is
supposed to be easier to use or somehow more convenient than the original
input. A simple example of this can be a program for classification that has
been devised to classify a set of objects into some predefined classes.
2.1.2 Issues in Current View
The following issues can be observed in the ‘current view’ with regard to the
goal of having machines capable of performing intellectual tasks with results
that can be comparable to humans’ results.
Issue 1. Abstractions are not designed as to be meaningful for computers
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Issue 2. The ‘criteria’ employed by an abstraction mechanism depend on
humans to be devised and adapted to each problem or class of problems
and specific situation
Issue 3. The resulting construct(s) (or ‘representation’) of an abstraction
mechanism can only be understood (or need to be interpreted) by hu-
mans.
Issue 4. Issue 1, Issue 2, and Issue 3 imply that currently the abstractions
that interact with computers are not computable (at least not as a
whole), and there is no defined mechanism that allows computers to
build and use abstractions based on their own criteria. This, in turn,
prevent the development of mechanisms that allow computers to build
and use their own ‘understanding’ of things, limiting their possibilities
towards performing intellectual tasks on their own, by being inevitably
dependent on humans’ criteria and understanding.
* ‘Computer understanding’ mentioned in Issue 4 has also a ‘current view’
(as part of artificial intelligence development), which is focused mainly
in information-seeking tasks such as text classification, information
retrieval, and information extraction [22]. Approaches in this area
have attempted to simulate inasmuch as possible an understanding of
natural language through the use of, for instance, probabilistic and
statistical methods (e.g., [14, 8, 9]). However, the models used in such
approaches are not computable abstractions, and thus the issues above
hold for them as well.
2.1.3 Proposed Solution
To deal with the issues listed above we first, in § 2.2, analyze the capabilities
of computers and the kind of objects that they have available. Based on this
analysis, we introduce in § 3 abstractions that can be built from the objects
available for computers, based on the computers’ capabilities, and following
criteria general enough as to be applied by any computer, to any problem,
in any situation. § 4 defines, with regard to our notion of understanding
provided in § 2.3, abstractional machines capable of building and using their
own understanding of things (built as a system of computable abstractions)
to perform their tasks.
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2.2 Operating Machines
Here, we analyze the kind of objects available for computers, in order to
later, in § 3, be able to define what kind of meaningful information can be
obtained from such objects, by computers. Some considerations related to
how computers interact with the outside world are also given, as they will
be necessary later in the paper.
Let us call operating machine to any model operationally equivalent to a
deterministic Turing machine. Examples of operating machines are, among
others, Knuth’s model [17], Kolmogorov machines [25], programming lan-
guages (e.g., C, C++, Python), and operating systems.
Let us call machine operation or simply operation to any action that has
been specified in an operating machine M and can be executed by M, i.e.,
it is a special kind of action that has been precisely and unambiguously
specified for an operating machine. We say that an operation is in some
specific operating machine if it is executable in that machine, that is, the
operation has been specified in that machine.
One can observe that all constructs that exist in or are used by an operat-
ing machine are operations, which the machine sees only as actions that are
to be performed. Such constructs include procedures (sometimes known as
routines, methods, etc.), data structures, data abstractions [5], user-defined
types, and, in general, any construct that has been defined in an operat-
ing machine. Even constructs that are defined as to carry meaning such as
knowledge representations [11] are for the machine only operations. We can
see that, currently, regardless of the meanings that they may have for us
(humans), those constructs only tell to the machine what to do and how to
do it, and the machine ought to follow such directions.
The specification of an operation in some operating machine may be seen
as to be given by a unique identifier 1 (unique forM) and a set or a sequence
of operations in M, which will be referred herein as the composition of the
operation. This unless the operation lies in the lowest operational level ofM,
in which case only the unique identifier is considered, and the set or sequence
of operations is assumed to exist, however, out of the scope ofM (e.g., opera-
tions ‘scan a symbol from the tape’ and ‘print a symbol on the tape’ are
in the lowest operational level of a Turing machine [24]). Herein, we denote
an operation ϕa specified by a set of operations as ϕa : {ϕ1, . . . , ϕn} and an
operation ϕb specified by a sequence of operations as ϕb : 〈ϕ1, . . . , ϕn〉.
In what respects to possible interactions between an operating machine
1This identifier should not be understood as a regular program’s name but rather as
what A.M. Turing defined as description number in [24]
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and its outside world, it can be said that an operating machine can recognize
(or process) an object outside if there is an executable operation in the
machine that is uniquely associated with the object outside.2 As examples,
one may consider any input given to an operating machine; it is not hard
to notice that such input needs a corresponding executable operation in the
machine in order to be recognized (or processed) by the machine.
2.3 Understanding
In this section, we describe aspects that can be observed on humans’ under-
standing, which are considered in § 4 for shaping the understanding of the
proposed abstractional machine.
I. Understanding an object may be regarded as to have meaningful infor-
mation about that object for some ‘specific purpose’.
II. We say that an understanding of an object ε combines together ab-
stractions related to ε (each with meaningful information) in a system
of abstractions, which provides the capability of distinguishing ε from
other objects, as well as to relate it to different objects, all this, poten-
tially, in different contexts (situations, or for different purposes) and
involving objects at different levels of abstraction. The understanding
or system of abstractions is adapted and grown as more meaningful
information is gathered
III. Meaningful information may appear at different abstraction levels, where
high-level information is built from primitive information. Meaningful
information is considered primitive if either it is accepted without need
for further understanding (i.e., as axioms) or it can be drawn by execut-
ing known actions. One may consider, for instance, a primitive action
such as ‘sliding a pencil over a piece of paper’, which, even without
understanding any of the high-level ideas involved (e.g., what a pencil
is), it allows to describe information about the pencil and the paper.
That is, if we use α as the identifier of the action ‘to slide over’, ε1 for
‘a pencil’, and ε2 as ‘a piece of paper’, executing α using ε1 on ε2 can
provide information about the objects involved, e.g., α can use ε1 and
act on ε2, and ε1 can interact with ε2 and is operable within α. Fur-
thermore, considering another simple action such as ‘to notice changes
2The consideration is neither about the operation(s) that may work (or interact) with
the object nor about the operation(s) in charge of process it; it is about the object in the
machine that refers to the object outside.
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in the color of ε2’, it would be possible to draw information that could
begin building an understanding on the high-level idea of ‘painting’.
IV. Understanding is created as it is needed and the amount of information
in someone’s understanding is based on what that someone has to do.
For instance, one may consider that a person has sufficient understand-
ing about some topic when that person is able to solve exercises or tests
on such topic.
V. Each individual builds its own understanding. In order for two individ-
uals to understand each other, i.e., achieve a common understanding,
the two respective understandings need not to be the same but simply
to share their purpose (e.g., the purpose of a person when saying “hello”
is to greet someone).
3 Computable Abstractions
From the analysis about operating machines in § 2.2, it should be clear that
to be suitable for machines, abstractions have to be built or derived from
the specifications of operations following a process that involves nothing but
the execution of operations (i.e., a mechanical process). To this end, we
find a criteria for building abstractions that any machine can apply to any
problem, in any situation.
3.1 Computable Concepts
Based on the specifications of operations, it is possible to describe “oper-
abilities” that an operation satisfies with respect to other operations. An
“operability” should be understood as the “ability” to be operable in a par-
ticular way.
“Operabilities” are indeed abstractions, since an “operability” may encom-
pass one or many objects (those of which are operable in the way defined
by the “operability”) and holds meaningful information about the objects it
encompasses, namely, one way in which they can be operable. Nonetheless,
not all “operabilities” that can be described from the specifications of oper-
ations can be processed by a machine (i.e., not all are computable). In fact,
many “operabilities” that could be intuitively recognized are not computable
as they depend on human thinking to be understood. For instance, based
on an operation print, we (humans) could intuitively recognize the “oper-
ability” ‘printable’. However, in order to recognize such “operability” it is
7
necessary first to have an understanding of what it means to print something
and then to understand what it means to be ‘printable’. As it is, an oper-
ating machine cannot do this, since for the machine the operation print is
(as any other operation) just an action that is to be executed following its
specification (i.e., the machine does not hold any meaning of its operations).
In order to describe computable “operabilities” from the specifications of
operations, it is necessary to consider only the aspects that an operating
machine can process from such specifications. These are:
i) an operating machine can distinguish between its operations based on
their unique identifiers;
ii) an operating machine has the description of the composition of its oper-
ations (those that do not lie on its most elementary operational level),
including the identifiers of the operations involved and, for the case of
a sequence, their order of execution
.
Definition 1. For an object x in some operation ϕ in an operating machine
M, we call computable concepts to the “operabilities” thatM can define about
x with respect to ϕ and its components. Computable concepts, which we
will denote by Ci (i being the unique identifier of the concept forM), can be
of two types:
[Type I] such that refers to ‘being operable within the specification of
some particular operation ϕ’, denoted as Ci(x) : ϕ(x) or simply
as Ci: ϕ(x)
[Type II] such that refers to ‘being operable within some particular set of
operations’ or, for the case of sequences, ‘... in a specific posi-
tion of a sequence of operations’; for instance, for a composition
sequence 〈ϕ1, ϕ2〉 of some operation, a concept Cj that refers to
‘being operable in the first position of a two-element sequence,
where the second element is ϕ2’ can be described by the machine,
being denoted as Cj(x): 〈x, ϕ2〉.
A concept may encompass more than one object, all of which satisfy the
operability that the concept represents. This defines an equivalence relation
between the objects that satisfy the concept. Thus, for instance, if we have
a concept defined as Ca: ϕa(x) and two objects a and b that satisfy this
concept, which we denote as a⊣Ca and b⊣Ca, then it follows that a and b
are equivalent with respect to Ca, i.e., a
Ca∼ b.
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Concepts may entail, as well, relations that are not necessarily equiv-
alence relations. For instance, if we know that ϕa is operable within the
specification of an operation ϕb and we define Ce: ϕb(x), we can say that
ϕa⊣Ce. And, since we have a⊣ Ca, with Ca: ϕa(x), we have then a relation
between the object a and Ce, i.e., a
Ca−→Ce, with which a is related to any
object that satisfies Ce.
An object in an operating machine may satisfy in general more than one
concept, through which it may get related to other operations and concepts.
When the object is indeed operating within the specification of a particu-
lar operation, one specific concept gets satisfied and the extent of relations
covered in general by the object gets restricted to a subset of operations
and concepts that are related to the concept that is being satisfied. For
instance, for a above, if we have that, in addition to Ca, a satisfies Cf (i.e.,
a⊣Cf ) through which it is related to some objects c and d. Thus, we have
a
Ca−→b,Ce,
3 and a
Cf
−→c, d, and in general a−→b,Ce, c, d. Then, when in an
execution a is operating in such a way as to satisfy Ca only (i.e., operating
within ϕa), the extent of relations of a gets restricted accordingly, that is,
a↾Ca−→b,Ce.
Computable concepts are valid for any executable object in an operating
machine, since all such objects can be operable in at least one way given
that they all can be executed and, thus, can be part of the composition of
some operation. Furthermore they allow to:
i) account for levels of abstractions based on operational levels (Type I);
ii) deal with contextual information (Type I and Type II);
iii) differentiate objects, since, in general, the only object that can be oper-
able in all the same ways as some object x, is the same object x;
iv) relate objects based on computable concepts of Type I, that is, all op-
erations that are part of the composition of an operation can be said to
be related;
v) relate objects based on computable concepts of Type II, that is, all
operations that appear surrounded by the same operations within two
different compositions can be said to be related.
3Equivalent objects appear underlined.
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3.2 Mechanical Abstracting Process
Given some executable operation ϕ in an operating machineM, a computable
abstraction of ϕ is obtained by describing ϕ based on the computable con-
cepts that ϕ can be found to satisfy in ‘selected’ operations inM. The criteria
to decide on what operations to select for the derivation of computable con-
cepts depends on what we called ‘specific purpose’ in the notion provided
about ‘understanding’ in § 2.3 and it is not part of the abstracting process.
(Abstractional machines presented in § 4 entail this ‘specific purpose’ in their
sets of tasks).
For instance, say we want to abstract (through a mechanical process)
an operation ϕ1 that is in an operating machine M, based on operations
ϕa : 〈ϕ1, ϕ2〉 and ϕb : 〈ϕ3, ϕ1, ϕ4〉, with ϕa, ϕb ∈ M. Then, we describe the
concepts that ϕ1 satisfies in ϕa and ϕb. These are C1 : ϕa(x), C2(x) : 〈x, ϕ2〉,
C3 : ϕb(x), and C4(x) : 〈ϕ3, x, ϕ4〉. Finally, the abstraction of ϕ1 stays as
ϕ1 ⊣ C1,C2,C3,C4 (1)
About this abstraction we should note:
• (1) is an abstraction entirely meaningful for M, including the object
being abstracted (i.e., ϕ1), and the meaningful information about it,
namely, the concepts that ϕ1 satisfies (which are meaningful for M).
That is, (1) is a computable abstraction. We can see that the ma-
chine itself has the explanation of the abstractions involved (e.g., ‘ϕ1
is encompassed by C1 because it is operable in ϕa’). Furthermore, the
process do not require human thinking to create more abstractions or
to explain them, it only requires to acquire (or abstract) more infor-
mation.
• Based on (1) ϕ1 can be used by the machine regardless if its speci-
fication is available or not, that is, the computable abstraction of ϕ1
allows the machine to, for instance, ‘forget about’ the specification of
ϕ1
• ϕ1 as well as any element of its abstract description and its description
as a whole are seen as separate objects. That is to say, the process
of mechanically abstracting ϕ1 does not imply to modify ϕ1, neither
in general nor for the machine for which is an abstraction. Instead,
the process yields a computable description of ϕ1, which can poten-
tially be associated with other objects (provided that they satisfy such
description) and serve to build other descriptions.
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To describe a computable abstraction of an object outside some machine
M it is necessary to use objects inM that are associated with objects outside.
Let us first recall from § 2.2 that any object outside M can be said to be
recognizable (or processable) by M if there is an executable operation in
M that is uniquely associated with that object. Thus, in order to describe
a computable abstraction, the concrete object outside M, let us call it ε,
has to be uniquely associated with an executable operation in M. Then,
ε is abstracted by considering the computable concepts that its associated
object, inM, satisfies with respect to objects also inM, which are themselves
associated with the objects outsideM that constitute the context of interest
for abstracting ε.
4 Abstractional Machines
Definition 2. An abstractional machine is a machine that follows a me-
chanical abstractional process through which it builds and uses a system of
computable abstractions (which constitutes its understanding of things) in
order to perform its tasks.
For an abstractional machine M˜ with a system of abstractions K˜, an
operating machine M serves as the foundation from which M˜ is defined. In
addition, M is on charge of executing all operations that M˜ needs to perform
as part of its mechanical abstractional process. Thus, M˜ should not be seen
as a model of computation but rather as a model that, based on an existing
operating machine, performs a particular kind of mechanical process, that is,
one that manipulates abstractions building its own understanding of things
based on them.
The definition of M˜ comprises the definition of the set Π of tasks (which
are executable operations in M) that are to be performed by M˜ and the
specification of how K˜ is to be built, including what is considered to be the
ground of K˜ and what are the abstraction levels of interest for M˜. The
set Π of tasks can be seen as to entail the ‘specific purpose’ for which the
understanding of M˜ is being built.
System of Computable Abstractions
The system of computable abstractions K˜ of M˜ is built as an abstractional
model, with its lowest abstraction level and criteria of decomposition estab-
lished as part of the definition of M˜.
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We call abstractional model to a construction of interest composed of a
collection of abstractions that comply with a given criteria of validity, where
there cannot be contradiction between any two abstractions in the model (as
for the the criteria of validity). The construction of an abstractional model
requires to establish an initial collection of abstractions that are considered of
foundational importance and are assumed to be non-contradictory between
each other. We call this the ground of the model. In addition, the abstraction
levels that are of interest for the model have to be established. First, the
lowest abstraction level (or elementary level) establishes the point from which
no further decomposition of abstractions is considered within the model.
Then, a criteria of decomposition establishes the components that will be of
interest for the model when considering each object. In order to build new
abstractions in the model, only abstractions from its ground or that have
been derived from its ground can be used. Therefore, a criteria of validity
imposed over abstractions in the ground of a model will extend to all its
derived abstractions, thus making the whole model consistent under such
criteria.
The reason to build K˜ as an abstractional model is to ensure its the con-
sistency and the regular behavior of M˜. Thus, the behavior of an abstrac-
tional machine depends on the current state of its system of abstractions. If
we consider an abstractional machine performing tasks in which its system of
abstractions do not suffer any modification, we will observe regular behavior.
However, if due to the abstractional process its system of abstractions gets
modified, then the behavior of the machine might vary accordingly. In spite
of this, since the system of abstractions is built as an abstractional model, it
is ensured that the construction will happen in a consistent manner, i.e., ab-
stractions in different stages of the construction of the system of abstractions
will never contradict each other.
Mechanical Abstractional Process
To describe the mechanical abstractional process followed by an abstrac-
tional machine M˜ we can picture it as a program P˜ of an operating machine
M. Thus, we say that M is expected to deal with a set of tasks Π in which
creating and using an understanding of the input is important or can be
regarded as beneficial. To deal with Π we define a program P˜ in M of a
particular kind: As any program, P˜ is specified to perform some particular
tasks, in this case Π. However, (differently from other type of programs)
P˜ will build and use its own understanding of the input that needs to be
understood to perform Π. Roughly, this process is performed by P˜ by at-
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tempting to combine in a consistent construction its initial understanding of
things (e.g., problem definition, base rules, or previous knowledge on similar
kind information) with the understanding that can obtain by abstracting,
through computable abstractions, the objects from the input involved in Π.
The process of including abstractions to the system of abstractions K˜ of
M˜ involves checking such abstractions against related objects in K˜. This
includes to check the relations that follow from the abstractions which, if
M˜’s definition states it, should be included into K˜. The abstractions and
consequent relations will be included into K˜ only if their inclusion preserves
the consistency of K˜ (as of the abstractional model construction).
4.1 Example
We consider the task of processing natural language. We observe that most,
if not all, activities within this task (e.g., to provide a definition of some word,
to provide a summary or a translation of some text) can be reduced to what
we shall call a “contextual relation”; that is, given a linguistic construction
λ, find a linguistic construction λ’ that is related to λ, within some context
σ (i.e., λ
σ
−→λ’).
First let us consider a very basic way in which an abstractional machine
could reach an understanding of some natural language. Say we have an
abstractional machine M˜ that has a task pi1 aimed to read texts that are
assumed to be meaningful in some natural language L and abstract them
putting them into its system of abstractions K˜, which in this case has on
its ground only the assumption that all texts that being read are meaning-
ful. Based on this simple task M˜ can build and understanding of linguistic
constructions in L , which allow M˜ to relate one linguistic construction to
others, as well as to differentiate it from other linguistic constructions. Thus,
the understanding of M˜ will not depend on human thinking but only on the
information that it can gather, i.e., the more texts M˜ reads the broader its
understanding can be. Let us consider a more concrete case. Suppose the
sentence “He is a good man” is given to M˜, and it is processed by the oper-
ating machine M that serves as M˜’s foundation as ϕs : 〈ϕ1, ϕ2, ϕ3〉, with ϕ1
associated with “He is a”, ϕ2 with “good”, and ϕ3 with “man”. From this, M˜
abstracts ϕ2 as ϕ2⊣C1,C2, where C1 : ϕs(x) and C2(x) : 〈ϕ1, x, ϕ3〉. Further-
more, let us consider that a sentence “He is a bad man” is also given, and
M process it as ϕ′s : 〈ϕ1, ϕ
′
2
, ϕ3〉, with ϕ
′
2
being associated with “bad”. From
here, M˜ abstracts ϕ′
2
as ϕ′
2
⊣C3,C2, where C3 : ϕs(x). Based on the com-
putable abstractions of ϕ2 and ϕ
′
2
, M˜ can describe the relation ϕ2
C2−→ϕ′
2
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(in fact, ϕ2
C2∼ ϕ′
2
), which is indeed a “contextual relation” at a primitive
abstraction level.
The more linguistic constructions M˜ finds in which ϕ2 is operable, the
more complete and narrower the description of ϕ2 will be for M˜, based on
the concepts that ϕ2 satisfies and the objects (concepts and other opera-
tions) that are related to it through those concepts. For instance, let us now
suppose that the sentence “He is very kind and generous” is given and identi-
fied as ϕt. In addition, let us eliminate from consideration the possibility of
the idea of ‘irony’, which would allow ϕt to appear next to ϕ
′
s meaningfully.
Thus, M˜ can find ϕu : 〈ϕs, ϕt〉 (but not a linguistic construction with compo-
sition 〈ϕ′s, ϕt〉). From here, M˜ abstracts ϕs as ϕs⊣Cβ, where Cβ(x) : 〈x, ϕt〉
4,
and then it abstracts ϕ2 accordingly, i.e., ϕ2
C2−→Cβ. Therefore, ϕ2 is singled
out from ϕ′
2
, since ϕ′s cannot not be found satisfying Cβ in this case.
The understanding that M˜ obtains of L based on pi1, another task pi2
can be defined for M˜ to check if some texts given as inputs are meaningful
or not (according to M˜’ understanding). This could be made more complete
by including in the ground of the system of abstractions of the machine
computable abstractions of grammar rules of L .
The kind of relation we skipped by avoiding the idea of ‘irony’ above, i.e.,
a “contextual relation” through a high-level context (or idea) (e.g., ϕs
irony
−→ϕ′s),
can also be managed (and obtained) by M˜. For M˜ to find the λ’ part of a
“contextual relation” with σ given as a high-level idea, it needs to abstract
the high-level context Thus, assuming that M˜ has a computable abstraction
of λ, it needs only to find a computable abstraction of the high-level context
σ , and then find the the linguistic construction(s) that can be related to both
abstractions (i.e., the concrete representation of λ and of σ) through any of
their related objects. The resulting linguistic construction(s) correspond to
λ’.
5 Conclusions and Future Work
The purpose of this paper has been to establish the basic theoretical foun-
dations for the construction of computable abstractions and the definition of
abstractional machines, which aim to provide a solution to the limitations
that computers exhibit under current approaches in performing intellectual
tasks with results comparable to humans’ results. The detailed study of
the applicability of abstractional machines is left for future work. However,
4 The other type of concept is omitted since it is not relevant for this example.
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their potential can be observed already. For instance, if we consider the
ability of handling complexity, we can notice that by making sense out of
an operation, an abstractional machine can use it, according to some un-
derstood purpose (e.g., to build other operations), without the need to have
or keep available its specification. Furthermore, in performing a process,
the machine can make sense out of the operations that are redundant or
unnecessary, if any, and skip them, when possible. Future work is expected
to explore relevant aspects of the new model presented, such as how to de-
fine an abstractional machine that can simulate any abstractional process
(i.e., a universal abstractional machine), as well as to study the applicability
of abstractional machines to concrete problems for which finding a purely
algorithmic solution has proved to be hard or impossible.
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